

Message Text

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TO USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANKARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
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AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ATHENS PRIORITY
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR
USLOSACLANT
CINCLANT
USDEL MC BRUSSELS

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:MPOL, NATO, DPC

SUBJ: SECRETARY OF DEFENSE STATEMENT FOR RECORD, DPC
MINISTERIAL

1. FOR USNATO. PLEASE PASS TEXT (PARA 3 BELOW) OF
SECRETARY BROWN'S STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FOR DPC MIN-
ISTERIAL MEETING 6-7 DECEMBER, TO SECGENERAL AND DPC

PERMREPS AS MATTER OF ADVANCE INFORMATION.

2. FOR ANKARA, BONN, BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, THE HAGUE, LISBON, LONDON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO, OTTAWA, REYKJAVIK, ROME. PLEASE PASS SOONEST TEXT IN PARA 3 TO DEF MINISTERS AS MATTER OF ADVANCE INFORMATION USING BRIEF LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL AS FOLLOWS: DEAR MR. MINISTER, I THOUGHT YOU MIGHT LIKE TO HAVE IN ADVANCE THE ATTACHED COPY OF THE STATEMENT WHICH I AM SUBMITTING TO SECRETARY GENERAL LUNS FOR INCORPORATION IN THE VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6-7 MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE. SINCERELY, HAROLD BROWN.

3. BEGIN TEXT. I WOULD LIKE AGAIN, AS I DID LAST MAY, TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN STATEMENT IN ADVANCE, SO THAT MY COLLEAGUES MAY BE APPRISED OF US VIEWS BEFORE WE MEET TOGETHER. ABOVE ALL, I BELIEVE THAT WE MINISTERS MUST USE OUR DECEMBER MEETING TO LEND A RENEWED SENSE OF ENERGY

AND PURPOSE TO THE PREPARATION OF A FAR-REACHING LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR OUR APPROVAL AND THEN THAT OF THE SUMMIT NEXT SPRING.

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THE NATO/WP BALANCE IS STILL OF SERIOUS CONCERN.

NOTHING THAT HAS HAPPENED SINCE WE MET LAST MAY HAS LESS-ENED MY CONCERN OVER THE EXISTING NATO/WP MILITARY BALANCE. ACCORDINGLY, THE NEED TO JOINTLY IMPROVE NATO'S DEFENSE POSTURE REMAINS URGENT. THE ONLY WAY TO DO THIS EFFECTIVELY IS THROUGH THE COLLECTIVE LONG-TERM PROGRAM WHICH CAN ACHIEVE IN ACTUALITY THE HIGHER LEVEL OF "DEFENSE COOPERATION" WHICH WE JOINTLY MANDATED LAST SPRING. ONLY BY THIS MEANS CAN WE SATISFY, IN MY JUDGMENT THE CHARGE PLACED UPON US BY OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT. I EXPECT THEM TO HOLD US TO ACCOUNT FOR OUR SUCCESS OR FAILURE AT THE NEXT SUMMIT.

IF ANYTHING I AM MORE CONCERNED BY THE NEED FOR US TO PULL TOGETHER THAN I WAS SEVEN MONTHS AGO. TRUE, MOST OF US HAVE IN TRAIN SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENTS IN OUR DEFENSE POSTURES, AS EVIDENCED IN THE 1977 DEFENSE REVIEW. MOREOVER, MOST OF US HAVE INCREASED OUR DEFENSE BUDGETS IN REAL TERMS IN 1977. IT IS ALSO ENCOURAGING TO SEE THE BROAD MEASURE OF NATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE SHORT-TERM MEASURES PROPOSED AS A RESULT OF OUR JOINT INITIATIVE LAST MAY.

US FORCE IMPROVEMENTS.

AS FOR THE US ITSELF, NOT ONLY HAVE WE SIGNIFICANTLY IN-

CREASED OUR DEFENSE EXPENDITURES IN REAL TERMS BUT WE HAVE IN TRAIN NOTABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN THE READINESS OF OUR FORWARD-DEPLOYED FORCES, THEIR MODERNIZATION, AND ABOVE ALL THEIR RAPID DEPLOYMENT IN A CRISIS. THIS LAST WILL BE A PARTICULARLY DRAMATIC CHANGE. INSTEAD OF MOST US REINFORCEMENTS NOT BEING AVAILABLE UNTIL AFTER 30 DAYS; WE ARE PROGRAMMING RESOURCES TO MORE THAN TRIPLE OUR TACTICAL AIR STRENGTH IN EUROPE WITHIN A WEEK AND ROUGHLY DOUBLE OUR GROUND FORCE STRENGTH IN ABOUT TEN DAYS.

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HOWEVER, THIS WILL BE HIGHLY DEPENDENT ON YOUR ACTIONS: ON YOUR MAKING AVAILABLE ADEQUATE RECEPTION FACILITIES AIRBASES AND STORAGE SITES FOR PREPOSITIONING; AND ON PARALLEL EUROPEAN IMPROVEMENTS TO HELP SHOW OUR CONGRESS THAT WE ARE NOT ACTING ALONE.

WHILE ACHIEVING ALL THESE GOALS WILL TAKE A FEW YEARS, I THINK YOU WILL AGREE THAT THEY WOULD REPRESENT A TRULY MAJOR IMPROVEMENT IN US ABILITY, TO COME TO THE AID OF

ITS ALLIES IN OUR MUTUAL INTEREST. MOREOVER, AS PART OF THIS EFFORT, WE ARE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERING SACEUR'S REQUEST TO EARMARK AN EARLY DEPLOYING THREE-DIVISION CORPS OF AFCENT RESERVE, WITH PRIORITY DEPLOYMENT TO THE NORTHAG AREA. IN SUM, WITHOUT GOING INTO MORE DETAIL ABOUT OUR NATO-ORIENTED FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, I CAN SAY THAT OUR PROGRAM INCREASES THE RESOURCES DEVOTED TO THEM BY A GREAT DEAL MORE THAN 3 PERCENT PER ANNUM IN REAL TERMS.

INCREASED NEED FOR VIGOROUS LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM.

BUT NEITHER THIS, NOR ALL THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT YOU TOO ARE MAKING, ARE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE NEED. AS THE 1977 DEFENSE REVIEW NOW BEFORE US SAYS, SHORTFALLS IN NATIONAL PLANS FOR 1978-1982 "REMAIN SERIOUS." THE GAP BETWEEN NATO AND WP CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES CONTINUES TO WIDEN. YET ONLY FOUR ALLIES REPORT THAT THEY PLAN REAL DEFENSE BUDGET INCREASES AVERAGING 3 PERCENT OR MORE ANNUALLY, AS CALLED FOR IN OUR 1977 MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE, WHILE FOUR ARE ACTUALLY REDUCING SUCH OUTLAYS IN 1978.

ALL THIS STARKLY UNDERLINES THE BASIC POINT UNDERLYING PRESIDENT CARTER'S AND MY OWN PROPOSALS LAST SPRING,
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AND REFLECTED IN OUR OWN 1977 GUIDANCE. IT IS THAT BEYOND THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE CAN REALISTICALLY ANTICIPATE THE FUNDING OF ADDED RESOURCES, WE NEED INCREASED CAPABILITY. THEREFORE, WE HAVE NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO USE

SUCH RESOURCES AS ARE AVAILABLE MORE WISELY THAN BEFORE. FOR ALL THE REASONS WHICH I GAVE LAST MAY, WE MUST SEEK MUCH MORE EFFICIENT UTILIZATION OF AVAILABLE RESOURCES THROUGH THE HIGHER DEGREE OF "ALLIANCE COOPERATION" FOR WHICH WE OURSELVES HAVE REPEATEDLY CALLED.

THIS NEED LED TO OUR JOINTLY EMBARKING ON THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM, NOW PAST ITS HALFWAY POINT. INDEED, LESS THAN THREE MONTHS REMAIN UNTIL THE TEN TASK FORCE REPORTS ARE DUE. YET SOME TASK FORCE REPORTS, I REGRET TO SAY, ARE FAR FROM THREE QUARTERS DONE. INsofar AS THIS IS OWING TO INADEQUATE NATIONAL RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR DATA, OF WHICH THE US ITSELF HAS ON OCCASION BEEN GUILTY, WE MUST DO BETTER. I PLEDGE THAT THE U.S. WILL DO BETTER. INsofar AS IT IS OWING TO DELAYED STARTS OR OTHER DISTRACTIONS, I URGE ON THE NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES A MAXIMUM EFFORT TO MAKE UP FOR LOST TIME. WE HAVE AN ENGAGEMENT WITH OUR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AT THE SUMMIT LATE NEXT SPRING. IT IS AN OPPORTUNITY WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MISS.

A PROGRESS REPORT ON THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (LTDP) IS NOW BEFORE US. I URGE YOU TO JOIN ME IN VIGOROUSLY ENDORSING ITS GUIDANCE TO THE VARIOUS TASK FORCES. EACH MUST NOW GIVE PARTICULAR EMPHASIS TO DEVELOPING SPECIFIED COLLECTIVE PROGRAMS IN A LIMITED NUMBER OF MAIN ACTION AREAS, BOTH MID AND LONGER TERM. IT MUST ALSO PROPOSE ADEQUATE MACHINERY TO HELP INSURE THAT THESE PROGRAMS ARE ACTUALLY CARRIED OUT.

THE EASIER PART OF THIS LTDP EXERCISE IS NOW OVER. THE NEXT PHASE WILL BE FAR MORE DIFFICULT, AS NATIONS BEGIN
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TO SEE MORE CLEARLY WHAT CONCRETE MEASURES--MANY OF THEM INEVITABLY INVOLVING INCREASED OUTLAYS OR AT LEAST SIGNIFICANT TRADE-OFFS--THEY WILL BE ASKED TO UNDERTAKE. I ALREADY NOTICE CERTAIN WITHDRAWAL SYMPTOMS AS THIS PROSPECT LOOMS. HENCE, I ASK YOU TO JOIN ME IN TELLING THE TASK FORCES NOT TOTRIM THEIR SAILS TO THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR OF PERCEIVED MULTINATIONAL CONSENSUS, BUT TO TELL US CANDIDLY WHAT THEY BELIEVE WE MUST DO COLLECTIVELY OVER THE NEXT DECADE--OF COURSE WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS THEY HAVE BEEN GIVEN. WE SHOULD ALSO GIVE CLEAR GUIDANCE TO THE NATO CIVIL AND MILITARY AUTHORITIES, WORKING WITH NATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES ON THE EXECUTIVE WORKING GROUP, TO THEN RESOLVE ANY CONFLICTS BETWEEN TASK FORCE PRIORITIES, PROPOSE REALLOCATIONS OR TRADEOFFS OF EXISTING RESOURCES TO THE EXTENT THAT MAJOR RESOURCE INCREASES SEEM UNLIKELY, AND PULL TOGETHER THE TASK FORCE EFFORTS INTO A COHERENT WHOLE.

NEED FOR MINISTERIAL LEVEL DECISIONS.

BUT IN THE LAST ANALYSIS ONLY WE MINISTERS OURSELVES CAN TAKE THE DIFFICULT DECISIONS NEEDED TO SET THE ALLIANCE FIRMLY ON A COURSE OF COLLECTIVITY. HENCE, I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WE MUST PERSONALLY DEVOTE GREATER TIME AND EFFORT TO THIS THAN WE HAVE IN THE PAST. THOUGH NATO'S COMMON DEFENSE TAKES BY FAR THE LARGEST SINGLE PORTION OF EACH ALLY'S ANNUAL OUTLAYS (EVEN THOSE OF THE US), DO WE GIVE IT A COMPARABLE SHARE OF OUR ATTENTION? I FIND THAT GIVEN THE WAY THE PENTAGON MACHINERY WORKS, I AM FORCED TO SPEND FAR MORE TIME ON UNILATERAL NATIONAL MATTERS THAN ON ALLIANCE COLLABORATION. AND ALL TOO OFTEN THESE DECISIONS ARE TAKEN AT EXPENSE OF COMMONALITY OR COOPERATION, RATHER THAN IN PURSUIT OF IT.

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AMONG OTHER THINGS, WE MUST FACE UP TO THE FACT THAT ALLIANCE COOPERATION CLEARLY IMPLIES MORE COMMON OR COOPERATIVE FUNDING. IF FLEXIBILITY AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS DICTATE A NATO STOCKPILE OF KEY MUNITIONS, WE SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS ITS COMMON OR COOPERATIVE FUNDING. ALONG SIMILAR LINES, CAN WE AFFORD TO LET THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM, ONE OF THE ALLIANCE'S MOST SUCCESSFUL COMMON EFFORTS, DECLINE IN REAL TERMS AT THE VERY TIME WHEN WE ARE MANDATING INCREASED "ALLIANCE COOPERATION?"

LACK OF PROGRESS IN COOPERATION ON ARMAMENTS.

I AM DISAPPOINTED--THOUGH NOT REALLY SURPRISED--BY THE SLOW PROGRESS SINCE LAST MAY TOWARD GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION IN EQUIPMENT DESIGN AND PROCUREMENT. A GREAT DEAL IS IN TRAIN, LARGELY SPURRED BY THE US ITSELF IN AN EFFORT TO MAKE UP FOR OUR PAST INDIFFERENCE. BUT ACTUAL AGREEMENTS ARE STILL FEW AND FAR BETWEEN.

HERE IS WHERE WE MOST NEED A NEW SPIRIT OF COOPERATION IN THE ALLIANCE--THOUGH HERE IS WHERE I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT MANY ALLIES ARE STILL WAITING FOR SOLID EVIDENCE THAT THE US WILL PRACTICE WHAT IT PREACHES--AND ACTUALLY BUY OR LICENSE EUROPEAN SYSTEMS. SO WE WILL TRY EVEN HARDER--ON JOINT DEVELOPMENT; TECHNOLOGY RELEASE, AND BUYING EUROPEAN. BUT OUR EFFORTS TO WORK OUT SUCH PROMISING MEANS AS JOINT FAMILIES OF EQUIPMENT OR MUNITIONS IN RELATED FIELDS WILL REQUIRE GIVE ON BOTH SIDES.

MOREOVER, LET US BEAR IN MIND THAT THE MOST IMPORTANT GOAL TO BE SOUGHT IN THIS AREA IS NOT COMMERCIAL ADVANTAGE BUT GREATER COLLECTIVE MILITARY EFFECTIVENESS. STANDARDIZATION, INTEROPERABILITY, COPROCUREMENT AND THE LIKE ARE THE MEANS TO THIS COMMON END, ALTHOUGH DOMESTIC POLITICAL IMPERATIVES REQUIRE THAT COMMERCIAL AND INDUS-

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TRIAL BENEFITS BE EQUITABLY SHARED AS WELL. WE MUST DEVELOP BETTER MEANS OF ACHIEVING BOTH GOALS VIA THE LTDP. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT WE MINISTERS SHOULD ASK THE CNADS TO PASS UP TO US FOR DECISION THOSE KEY ISSUES ON WHICH THEY ARE UNABLE TO AGREE.

ON THIS SCORE, I REGRET THAT MY MAY 1977 PROPOSALS FOR AN ALL-OUT EFFORT TO ACHIEVE TRUE INTEROPERABILITY OF KEY TACTICAL COMMUNICATIONS BEFORE THE 1990'S HAS NOT YET BORNE FRUIT, LARGELY BECAUSE SOME COUNTRIES ARE APPARENTLY TOO FAR ALONG WITH THEIR OWN SYSTEMS TO MODIFY THESE. LET ME URGE, HOWEVER, THAT YOU JOIN ME IN A RENEWED MAN-DATE TO OUR SPECIALISTS TO FIND OTHER MEANS OF SOLVING THIS URGENT PROBLEM BY SPRING 1978.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

IN SUM, WE DEFENSE MINISTERS MUST MAKE THESE BRIEF BI-ENNIAL SESSIONS MORE THAN ROUTINE OCCASIONS ON WHICH WE

ENDORSE BOLD RHETORIC BUT THEN RETURN TO OUR SEPARATE NATIONAL WAYS. THE NEW US ADMINISTRATION HAS MADE NATO DEFENSE THE CENTERPIECE OF ITS DEFENSE POSTURE. WE SPEND SEVERAL TIMES AS MUCH ON IT AS ON OUR OWN STRATEGIC FORCES--WHICH ARE ALSO LINKED TO EUROPE'S DEFENSE. BUT WE CAN'T DO IT ALONE--NOR CAN YOU. AS I SAID LAST APRIL, IF WE WANT CREDIBLE DETERRENCE/DEFENSE IN THE EIGHTIES AT A COST WE CAN SUSTAIN POLITICALLY, WE MUST DEVELOP A BALANCED COALITION POSTURE TO CARRY OUT IN PRACTICE THE COALITION STRATEGY WE PROFESS. SINCE THE LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM IS THE BEST AVAILABLE VEHICLE FOR THIS PURPOSE, I URGE THAT WE SEEK JOINTLY, AT THIS DECEMBER MEETING, WAYS TO MAXIMIZE ITS CHANCES FOR SUCCESS. END TEXT. VANCE
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